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In cellular networks, the roaming interconnection was designed when there were
only a few trusted parties and security was not a major concern or design criteria.
Most of the roaming interconnections today are still based on the decades-old
SS7 and the lack of security is being blamed for several vulnerabilities. Recent
research indicates that the roaming interconnection has been widely misused for
gaining access to the core network. Several attacks have been demonstrated by
malicious attackers and other unauthorized entities such as intelligence agencies
by exploiting the SS7 signaling protocol. Some operators moved to the more
modern LTE (Long Term Evolution) and Diameter Signaling for high-speed data
roaming and enhanced security. While LTE offers very high quality and resilience
over the air security, it still requires special security capabilities and features to
secure the core network against attacks targeting the roaming interconnection.
This thesis analyses and identifies attacks that exploit the roaming interconnec-
tion and Diameter signaling used in LTE networks. The attacks are analyzed in
accordance with the mobile network protocol standards and signaling scenarios.
The attacks are also implemented in a test LTE network of a global operator.
This thesis also focuses on potential countermeasures to mitigate the identified
attacks.
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Abbreviations and Acronyms
2G/3G/4G/5G 2nd/3rd/4th/5th Generation (wireless telephone tech-
nology)
3GPP 3rd Generation Partnership Project
AAA Authentication, Authorization, Accounting
AIA Authentication Information Answer
AIR Authentication Information Request
APN Access Point Name
AuC Authentication Center
BSS Base Station Subsystems
BTS Base Transceiver Station
CHAP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
CLA Cancel Location Answer
CLR Cancel Location Request
CSG Closed Subscriber group
DEA Diameter Edge Agent
DoS Denial of Service
DRA Diameter Routing Agent
DSA Delete Subscriber Data Request
DSR Delete Subscriber Data Answer
E-UTRAN Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network
EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol
EAP-GSM Extensible Authentication Protocol for Global System
for Mobile Communications
EAP-SIM Extensible Authentication Protocol for Subscriber
Identity Modules
EIR Equipment Identity Register
eNB evolved Node B
EPC Evolved Packet Core
EPS Evolved Packet System
GPRS General Packet Radio Service
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GRX GPRS Roaming Exchange
GSM Global System for Mobile communication
GT Global Title
GTP-C GPRS Tunnelling Protocol for Control plane
GTT Global Title Translation
H-PCRF Home PCRF
HeNodeB Home evolved Node B
HLR Home Location Register
HPLMN Home Public Land Mobile Network
HSS Home Subscriber Server
IDA Insert Subscriber Data Answer
IDR Insert Subscriber Data Request
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
IP Internet Protocol
IPX IP Packet Exchange
ITU-T International Telecommunication Union Telecommu-
nication Standardization Sector
LTE Long Term Evolution
MAC Media Access Control
MAP Message Application Part
MAP PRN MAP Provide Roaming Number
MAP SRI MAP Send Routing Information
MCC Mobile Country Code
MiTM Man in The Middle
MME Mobility Management Entity
MNC Mobile Network Code
MS Mobile Station
MSC Mobile Switching Center
MSISDN Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory
Number
MSRN Mobile Station Roaming Number
MTP Message Transfer Part
NAI Network Access Identifier
NDC National Destination Code
NDS Network Domain Security
NOA Notification Answer
NOR Notification Request
NSS Network Switching Subsystem
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
P-GW Packet data network Gateway
PAP Password Authentication Protocol
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PCEF Policy Control Enforcement Function
PCRF Policy Control and Charging Rules Function
PDCP Packet Data Convergence Protocol
PDN Packet Data Network
PDP Protocol Data Packet
PKI Public Key Infrastructure
PLMN Public Land Mobile Network
PSTN Public Switched Telephone Network
PUA Purge Answer
PUR Purge Request
QoS Quality of Service
RAN Radio Access Network
RLC Radio Link Control
RRC Radio Resource Control
RSA Reset Request
RSR Reset Answer
S-GW Serving Gateway
SAE System Architecture Evolution
SCCP Signaling Connection Control Part
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
SMS Short Message Service
SMSC Short Message Service Center
SRR Send Routing Info for SM Request
SRVLOC Service Location Protocol
SS7 Signaling System No. 7
SSN Sub System Numbers
TCAP Transaction Capabilities Application Part
TLS Transport Layer Security
TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
UE User Equipment
UICC Universal Integrated Circuit Card
ULA Update Location Answer
ULR Update Location Request
UMTS Universal Mobile Telecommunications System
USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module
V-PCRF Visited PCRF
VLR Visitor Location Register
VPLMN Visited Public Land Mobile Network
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Over the last two decades, mobile network coverage grew significantly and
has become an important part of today’s communication infrastructure. The
extent of the populace covered by a cellular network grew from 58% in 2001
to 95% in 2015 [1]. The near-ubiquitous network coverage coupled with
affordable mobile devices and smart phones has led to the vast increase in
the number of mobile users. By the end of 2015, there were more than 7
billion mobile cellular subscriptions [1]. The number of 4G subscriptions was
nearly one billion and predicted to reach 3.1 billion by 2019 [2]. Considering
all these facts, it is not surprising that mobile networks have become more
attractive targets also for the darker sides of life.
The security of cellular networks has evolved considerably over the last
three decades. Due to the emerging threats and various limitations found in
the analog systems, some security functions where introduced in the Global
System for Mobile communication (GSM) systems during its standardization
three decades ago. Firstly, eavesdropping on conversations by using simple
radio receivers in the earlier systems led to the specification of encryption on
the radio interface. Secondly, tamper-resistant SIM cards were introduced to
address the risk of fraud attacks on billing. This provided strong subscriber
authentication and robust charging. Finally, to address the issues of sub-
scriber privacy, randomized temporary identities were introduced to make
it difficult to track subscribers. Many vulnerabilities in GSM security have
been discovered in the last decade. Even then the GSM security goals were
met because it was past the economic lifetime for which GSM was initially
designed. To overcome these challenges in 3G systems, further security im-
provements were made. The most important ones are mutual authentication
to identify false base stations, stronger encryption algorithms and moving
the encryption deeper into the network. When the 4G Long Term Evolution
(LTE) standard was set, the user data encryption is moved back to the base
9
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station and enhanced key management was introduced to prevent physical
tampering of base stations. Overall, the LTE air interface security is very
similar to that of the 3G networks. This paragraph has been adapted from
[3].
Contemplating on the thinking behind 2G to 4G security, it can be said
that security measures were instigated to protect voice and packet data
services to safeguard the charging mechanism and also to protect the sub-
scriber’s privacy [3]. Besides protecting subscriber privacy and the confiden-
tiality and integrity of their communication, the protection of the network
itself against any form of attack is of paramount importance. In the past
years, many open-source implementations of radio base-band stacks have
become available which resulted in a number of “proof of concept” attacks
exploiting vulnerabilities in the implementation or configuration of mobile
network nodes. In spite of the strong security measures, 3G and 4G sys-
tems are still prone to attacks because of the practicality of implementing
these measures, misconfiguration of network elements and negligence of some
telecom operators.
As per the International Telecommunication Union-Telecommunication
Standardization Sector (ITU-T), “interconnect” is defined as
“The commercial and technical arrangements under which service providers
connect their equipment, networks and services to enable customers to have
access to the customers, services and networks of other service providers.”
[4].
Interconnects are highly important in telecommunication networks as
they help the network operators to provide services consistently to their
subscribers, even in the regions where the operators do not operate. Three
decades ago when Signaling System No. 7 (SS7) protocol was designed, there
were only a few state owned operators and the interconnection network was a
private network built upon trust. Today the situation has completely changed
due to the market liberalization and there are more operators than they could
have ever anticipated when SS7 was standardized. The confluence of decades
old SS7 with the IP-based LTE networks has given rise to a need for addi-
tional security enforcement. While the air interface security got quite some
attention and substantial improvement to keep abreast with the latest at-
tack vectors, the interconnection security has not received the same amount
of improvement or attention.
Research problem: The goal of this thesis is to thoroughly analyze the
signaling on LTE roaming interconnection and to identify various threats.
We aim to achieve the following:
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1. Identify the existing and possibly new attacks on the LTE roaming
interconnection.
2. Provide proof-of-concept for the discovered attacks.
3. Analyze the attacks and suggest potential countermeasures.
Research methods: We first theoretically analyze the signaling protocol
on a roaming interface to find loopholes and then attempt to discover pos-
sible ways to cause privacy breach, fraud and service denial. Subsequently,
the attacks will be verified in a test network of an operator that reflects the
realistic key features of a LTE network to prove that they actually work.
Finally, the network data packets are captured and analyzed.
Impact and sustainable development: As only about 50% of the
commercial network operators have deployed LTE, identifying and evaluating
threats in LTE networks can foster its adoption and ensure the security
of the future LTE deployments. LTE networks have two main advantages,
first, it will increase the efficiency of the entire network thereby resulting in
substantial energy savings. Second, it will make network operations easier
to manage and results in cost savings.
Our research brings in ethical impacts to the society since it identifies the
various security threats leading to service denial, privacy invasion and fraud,
that may be exploited by criminals and foreign governments. We hope that
through this research, the communities and the network operators can see
the importance of these threats and spend a considerable amount of time
and incorporate countermeasures to mitigate them.
1.1 Structure of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview
of LTE networks. Chapter 3 provides a brief survey about the existing re-
search in 4G security. Chapter 4 presents an overview of the interconnection
network, signaling protocols and their vulnerabilities. Chapter 5 discusses
the threat model and attacks on the 2G and 3G signaling and the newly
identified attacks in LTE signaling. Chapter 6 presents the results of the ex-
periments conducted to verify the attacks. Chapter 7 presents the potential
countermeasures and mitigation strategies. Finally, chapter 8 concludes the
thesis.
Chapter 2
Long Term Evolution (LTE) Net-
works
Mobile networks are gradually transforming into data networks and shifting
towards an open and flat architecture which is inherently more vulnerable
to security threats. This transition is being driven by the increase of smart-
phones and moving to Internet Protocol (IP) [5] based architecture in 4G LTE
networks. So, LTE networks have a possibility of inheriting vulnerabilities
that exist in other IP networks, such as the Internet. Furthermore, the
exponential growth in traffic makes it more difficult for operators to protect
their networks [6].
The 4G networks are an evolution of the third generation Universal Mo-
bile Telecommunications System (UMTS). The evolution of the radio access
through Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) is
termed the Long Term Evolution (LTE). The evolution of the non-radio as-
pects is termed System Architecture Evolution (SAE), which includes the
Evolved Packet Core (EPC) network. LTE and SAE together are called
the Evolved Packet System (EPS). Unlike the earlier generation cellular sys-
tems which provide circuit-switched services, the EPS has been designed to
support primarily packet-switched services. EPC, EPS and SAE are Third
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) standard terms for the 4G cellular
technologies but the marketing branches of telecom operators and manu-
facturers decided to label the whole 4G technology as LTE and market it
under that name. Hereafter in the thesis, the term LTE refers to EPS. The
structure of this chapter is adapted from [7].
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2.1 Network Architecture
From a high level point of view, LTE has three main components: the user
equipment (UE), the E-UTRAN and the EPC. The communication with
other IP networks, such as the IP multimedia subsystem (IMS), and the
Internet is carried out through the EPC. The high level architecture of LTE
is shown in Figure 2.1. The following sections will give a brief overview of
the main components and their interfaces.
Figure 2.1: High Level Architecture of LTE [7]
2.1.1 User Equipment
The UE is a mobile device or a smartphone with an integrated Universal
Integrated Circuit Card (UICC). The UE has two main functions. Firstly, it
handles all the communication between the E-UTRAN and the mobile device.
Secondly, it terminates the data streams received from the E-UTRAN. The
UICC is a smart card that replaces the 2G Subscriber Identity Module (SIM)
card. Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) [8] is an application
that runs on the UICC, which stores the user’s network access credentials
and home network identity. Certain operators provide device management
servers from which the USIM can download the required data. The primary
use of USIM is to carry out security related operations such as authentication
and key exchange between the subscriber and the network.
The radio interface between the radio access network and the UE is the
Uu interface. It includes the user and control planes and allows data transfer
between the eNodeB and the UE. The Radio Resource Control (RRC) signal-
ing is part of the control plane whereas the Radio Link Control (RLC), Packet
Data Convergence Protocol (PDCP), and Media Access Control (MAC) lay-
ers are part of the user plane protocols [9].
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2.1.2 Evolved UMTS Terrestrial Radio Access Net-
work
The architecture of E-UTRAN is shown in the Figure 2.2. The E-UTRAN
has just one component called the evolved Node B (eNodeB). The radio
communications between the EPC and the UE are handled by the E-UTRAN.
In wireless telephony, a cell is the geographical area covered by a cellular
transmission facility. Each eNodeB is a base transmitter station (or simply
called a base station) which controls the mobile devices in a single cell or
multiple cells. The eNodeB sends and receives radio transmissions from its
mobile devices using the analogue and digital signal processing functions of
the LTE air interface. The eNodeB also sends signaling messages, such as
handover commands that relate to those radio transmissions [7].
Figure 2.2: Architecture of E-UTRAN [7]
The S1 [10] interface connects the eNodeBs to the EPC. An eNodeB is
connected to a nearby eNodeB by the X2 [11] interface. The X2 user plane
provides forwarding of buffered packet data when the UE moves between
different eNodeBs. The X2 control plane provides various functions and
procedures between eNodeBs that are related to handover and management
of load-balancing [9]. The X2 and S1 interfaces are just logical connections
and the data is routed through an underlying IP transport system.
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Operators increase the capacity of their networks through smaller base
stations called Home eNodeB (HeNodeB) [12], which provide femtocell cov-
erage within the subscriber’s home. HeNodeBs provide better coverage and
higher data rates compared to eNodeBs. The S1 communications for a HeN-
odeB are secured more carefully than normal as the HeNodeB connects to
the EPC through the subscriber’s ISP.
2.1.3 Evolved Packet Core
The core network is called EPC. The architecture of the EPC is shown in Fig-
ure 2.3. It is responsible for the overall control of the UE and establishment
of the bearers [13]. The main components of EPC are described below:
Figure 2.3: Architecture of EPC (Non-Roaming Scenario) [7]
1. Mobility Management Entity (MME) controls the high-level operations
of the control plane such as subscriber and session management. The
MME sends signaling messages to a mobile device about issues such
as security, terminal-to-network session handling and location manage-
ment. Each mobile device is associated with a single MME which may
change with the mobility of the user. The associated MME is called its
serving MME.
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2. Home Subscriber Server (HSS) is the heart of the EPC. It is a central
database that stores information about all the subscribers of the net-
work. It holds subscription data which includes user identification and
addressing, access restrictions, Quality of Service (QoS) profile, default
PDN configuration and the identity of the serving MME. The HSS
is generally integrated with the Authentication Center (AUC), which
generates the security keys and authentication vectors.
3. Packet data network Gateway (P-GW) is the point of interconnect
between the EPC and the external IP networks. The P-GW routes
packets to and from the PDNs. The P-GW also performs various func-
tions such as IP address and IP prefix allocation, policy control and
charging [14].
4. Serving Gateway (S-GW) transports the IP data traffic between the
UE and the external networks. It is the point of interconnect between
the radio-side and the EPC and serves the UE by routing the incoming
and outgoing IP packets. It is logically connected to the P-GW [14].
5. The Policy Control and Charging Rules Function (PCRF) is primarily
responsible for policy making and control decisions. It also supports
QoS authorization (QoS class identifier and bit rates), flow-based charg-
ing and service data flow detection [15].
LTE has many interfaces and reference points. The detailed information
about the interfaces is beyond the scope of this thesis. Some of the interfaces
in EPC are briefly discussed below:
1. The S1 interface is defined between the E-UTRAN to the EPC. The
S1-MME interface connects the eNodeB and MME. It is responsible
for reliable and guaranteed delivery of user data between the eNodeB
and the MME. The S1-U connects the eNodeB and MME. It provides
non-guaranteed data delivery of LTE user plane Protocol Data Units
(PDUs) between the eNodeB and the S-GW [9].
2. The S5 and S8 interfaces [16] provide user plane tunneling and tunnel
management between S-GW and P-GW. S8 is the inter PLMN variant
of S5.
3. The S6a interface is an Authentication-Authorization-Accounting (AAA)
interface that lies between the HSS and MME. This interface is dis-
cussed in detail in section 4.2.4.
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4. The S11 interface [17] sits between the S-GW and MME. It is based on
GPRS Tunnelling Protocol for Control plane (GTP-C) with additional
functions for mobility and paging coordination [18].
5. The SGi interface [19] is the gateway between the EPC network and the
connected PDN. This interface specifies the end of the EPC network as
the connected PDN generally belongs to a different network operator
[20].
6. The Gx interface [21] lies between the PCRF and the Policy Control
Enforcement Function (PCEF). It enables the PCRF to have dynamic
control over the policy and charging control behavior at the PCEF.
7. The Rx interface [22] lies between the operator-provided service and
PCRF. This interface provides the transport of application-level session
information [23].
2.2 Roaming Architecture of LTE
Roaming allows a subscriber to move outside their home network opera-
tor’s coverage area and access the services through another operator’s net-
work. For a roaming subscriber, the HSS will always be in the home network
whereas the UE, E-UTRAN, MME and S-GW are always in the visited net-
work. IP Exchange (IPX) and GPRS Roaming Exchange (GRX) are the two
GSMA standard interconnection models used for roaming [24]. Depending
on the location of the PDN gateway, the roaming architecture is categorized
into either home routing or local breakout.
2.2.1 Home Routing
The home routing architecture is shown in Figure 2.4. In this architecture,
the PDN gateway lies in the home PLMN of the subscriber. By using home
routing, all the traffic from the visited PLMN is routed to the subscriber’s
home PLMN and the home network operator can charge for it directly. Com-
munications with the the Internet generally use home routing.
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Figure 2.4: Roaming Architecture with Home Routing [7]
2.2.2 Local Breakout
The local breakout architecture is shown in Figure 2.5. In this architecture,
the PDN gateway lies in the visited PLMN. The Visited PCRF (V-PCRF)
and the Home PCRF (H-PCRF) are connected through the S9 interface.
The S9 interface provides transfer of charging control information and QoS
policies between the H-PCRF and the V-PCRF [25].
This architecture has two important benefits for voice communications.
Firstly, a user can make a local call or send a message without the traffic
getting routed back to the home network. Secondly, the local emergency
services can handle the emergency calls. Communications with the IP mul-
timedia subsystem generally use local breakout [7].
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Figure 2.5: Roaming Architecture with Local Breakout [7]
Chapter 3
Related Research
After the standardization of 4G networks, many research results on 4G se-
curity have been published. In this chapter we give a brief overview of the
research related to security of LTE and 4G networks.
The research in [26] gave a generic overview of security threats in 4G net-
works and also proposed a tool to analyze the security vulnerabilities of 4G
networks. It presented various vulnerabilities in WiFi and WiMAX technolo-
gies, which could be inherited by 4G networks. Furthermore, it also indicated
that 4G systems might inherit most of the IP-specific security vulnerabili-
ties and threats because of their IP based architecture. In [27] the security
architecture of LTE has been analysed with respect to Medium Access Con-
trol (MAC) layer security issues. This study discussed about various threats
in LTE networks by exploiting the vulnerabilities in MAC layer. Some of
these threats include denial of service attacks, replay attacks, eavesdropping
attacks and data integrity attacks. The research in [28] dealt with the se-
curity of 4G networks with respect to application layer. It also dealt with
the security issues of IPv6 wireless networks in 4G systems. Additionally,
it also proposed some countermeasures and strategies to defend against the
identified security issues.
The research in [29] dealt with network access security in 4G systems. It
analysed EPS architecture and discussed EPS security threats and require-
ments. The research in [30] analyzed the privacy and security threats on
the LTE radio interface and identified several new threats which include ac-
tive attack and location tracking attack. The research in [31] investigated
the security of 3GPP Authentication and Key Exchange (AKA) protocol and
identified certain threats, such as false base station attack, redirection attack
and impersonation attack. Furthermore, it proposed an enhancement to the
AKA protocol to mitigate these threats. The research in [32] dealt with
security issues in 3GPP roaming architecture, such as man-in-the-middle
20
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(MiTM) attacks and practical problems with the security algorithms used in
AKA protocol. Additionally, it also proposed solutions to these issues with
two different architectures. The research in [33] dealt with the relationship
between performance and security in the 4G signaling plane. It also analysed
the performance overhead caused due to the security in signaling plane.
As evident from the above information, most research in the field of 4G
security is focused on air interface security and security architecture whereas
the research on interconnection security and signaling protocols is minimal.
In this thesis, we concentrate on interconnection security and aim to go one
step forward towards a sound telecom security architecture.
Chapter 4
Roaming Interconnection and Sig-
naling
As per the International Telecommunication Union-Telecommunication Stan-
dardization Sector (ITU-T), “signaling” is defined as
“The exchange of information (other than by speech) specifically concerned
with the establishment, release and other control of calls, and network man-
agement, in automatic telecommunications operations” [34].
SS7 is the most widely used signaling protocol on the interconnection
network in both 2G and 3G cellular systems. It is gradually being replaced
by Diameter protocol [35] in the 4G systems. This chapter briefly discusses
the roaming interconnection and its signaling protocols.
4.1 SS7 Signaling
Signaling System No. 7 (SS7) is a ITU-T standard signaling protocol for ex-
changing information between different telecom network nodes over a digital
signaling network. It is used in mobile networks and fixed-line networks for
establishment and tearing down of calls, routing, information exchange and
billing. The following sections briefly discuss the 2G core network architec-
ture for better understanding of the SS7 interconnection.
4.1.1 2G Core Network Architecture
The 2G core network architecture is shown in Figure 4.1. The Home Public
Land Mobile Network (HPLMN) is the network to which the mobile user is
subscribed. All the other networks to which a mobile user can connect are
called Visited Public Land Mobile Networks (VPLMNs). During roaming
22
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the VPLMN will fetch the subscriber data (such as subscription information,
profile, service restrictions) from the HPLMN. The core network entities are
briefly discussed below:
Figure 4.1: 2G Core Network Architecture [36]
1. Mobile Station (MS) is the mobile device with a 2G SIM card. It has
the same functionality as the UE in LTE.
2. Base Transceiver Station (BTS) is a radio equipment that facilitates
radio communication between the MS and a network. BTS is the pre-
decessor of eNodeB.
3. Home Location Register (HLR) is a centralized database that stores
information about all the subscribers of the network [37]. HLR is the
predecessor of HSS.
4. Visitor Location Register (VLR) is a server that ensures mobility man-
agement and call-handling functions of the subscriber, who is roaming
in the VLR’s network. VLR obtains the subscription information from
the subscriber’s HLR and maintains a temporary record while the sub-
scriber is roaming.
5. Mobile Switching Center (MSC) controls the Network Switching Sub-
system (NSS) and performs various operations, such as communication
switching (call setup, routing and tear down), interface management
and billing. The VLR functionality is often combined with the MSC.
The Gateway Mobile Switching Centre (GMSC) is an edge MSC that
is used to route calls to and from the other mobile networks. MME in
LTE is the successor of the combined MSC/VLR.
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6. Short Message Service Center (SMSC) handles Short Message Service
(SMS) operations such as routing, forwarding, storing and delivering
messages [38].
4.1.2 SS7 Protocol Stack
SS7 has different possible protocol stack combinations based on the types
of services that are being offered. A traditional SS7 protocol stack includes
Message Transfer Parts (MTP 1, 2, and 3), Signaling Connection Control
Part (SCCP), Transaction Capabilities Application Part (TCAP), Telephony
User Part (TUP), ISDN User Part (ISUP) and Message Application Part
(MAP). These protocols are categorized into functional abstractions called
levels based on their functionality. SS7 uses a four level protocol stack with
reference to the Open System Interconnection (OSI) seven layer model [39].
A comparison between SS7 protocol stack and the OSI layered model in
shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: SS7 Protocol Stack vs OSI Layered Model [40]
MAP protocol is one of the most important protocols in the SS7 stack.
It provides an application layer for various network nodes in 2G and 3G
networks. It also allows communication between the nodes of NSS and en-
ables them to provides various services, such as subscriber authentication,
location management, subscription management, and fault recovery. In the
latest 3GPP specifications, MAP supports about 81 different services [41].
These services are categorized into mobility services, location management
services, operation and maintenance, supplementary services, and Protocol
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Data Packet (PDP) context services [42]. MTP, SCCP, and TCAP are used
to encapsulate and transport MAP.
4.2 Diameter Signaling in LTE
Diameter protocol defined in RFC 3588 [35] is the next generation Authentication-
Authorization-Accounting (AAA) protocol. It is an application layer peer-to-
peer (P2P) protocol that evolved from the RADIUS [43] protocol. Diameter
runs on top of TCP/IP and also supports SCTP [44], which is a widely
used transport protocol in telecom networks. Diameter is a message based
request-answer protocol. The data units in a Diameter message are called
Attribute Value Pairs (AVPs). A comprehensive tutorial about Diameter
base protocol can be found in [45].
Figure 4.3: Diameter Interfaces in LTE [23]
Mobile networks require secure and efficient provision of AAA services, so
Diameter was chosen by 3GPP for signaling and AAA provisioning in 4G and
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all next generation mobile networks. Figure 4.3 shows the Diameter based
interfaces in a LTE network.
4.2.1 Diameter Signaling Stack
The comparison between Diameter and SS7 signaling stacks is illustrated in
Figure 4.4. The network and transport layer protocols of SS7 such as MTP2
and MTP3 are replaced by SCTP/IP in Diameter. The session, presentation
and application layer protocols such as SCCP, TCAP and MAP are replaced
with Diameter protocol.
Figure 4.4: Diameter vs SS7 stack
4.2.2 Security Considerations in Diameter
Due to the increased security concerns in the communication protocols built
on top of IP networks, Diameter has been designed to provide several security
features. In spite of the security features being provided by Diameter, the
actual security offered will completely rely on factors such as complete and
correct implementation of Diameter. 3GPP standards assume that nodes on
either sides of the interconnection can be trusted as these nodes reside within
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the domain of trusted operator network, or the communication between the
nodes beyond interconnection is secured individually as per Network Domain
Security NDS/IP Security [46] using TLS or IPsec by the operators. In
practice this proves to be a business challenge as the operators often do
not connect their nodes directly with their partners over interconnection,
instead they utilize roaming hubs in order to provide their customers with a
large base of roaming partners. The implementation of security features over
the roaming hubs raises reliability concerns as the communication between
Diameter nodes connected by the roaming hubs may not be using NDS/IP
Security.
Inbuilt Global Title Translation (GTT): One of the main reasons
for the attacks that abuse the SS7 interconnection is the exposure of critical
nodes of the core network nodes to the partner or attackers from outside
the home network. In this realm, the Global Title Translation functionality
provides protection to the core network nodes by reducing the need for ex-
plicitly disclosing the GTs of the nodes of entire network in the routing tables
of a communication message. GTT hides the topology of critical infrastruc-
ture, such as HSS and EIR, by provisioning internal routing tables within
the nodes rather than the communication message. The concept of GTT is
implemented by default in Diameter suite, particularly in HSS. Along with
mutual node authentication, GTT protects the core network against port
scanning and impersonation attacks. On the other hand, operators tend to
use and assign ranges of global titles to their nodes. Therefore, an attacker
who has knowledge of one valid global title e.g. SMSC can start from there
a brute force probing attack to discover other core network nodes.
Dynamic peer discovery: Diameter is capable of dynamic peer discov-
ery methods using which a Diameter client can discover the next hop node
to forward Diameter messages. In a nutshell, a Diameter node broadcasts
the application and security level that they support, so that the neighboring
nodes can dynamically discover the appropriate peers using either SRVLOC
(Service Location Protocol) [47] or DNS Service Protocol [48]. Upon discov-
ering a new peer, the relevant information about the peer location (realm
name and IP address) and routing configurations along with the application
and service that the peers support will be stored in peer tables and peer
routing tables respectively. In terms of local storage of application specific
routing information, the dynamic peer discovery feature adds another level
of security as an attacker cannot learn the routing paths or IP addresses
of critical nodes. Dynamic peer discovery makes the configuration of net-
works much easier since the sender does not need to be aware of the internal
IP addresses. However, an attacker can easily misuse such automatic mecha-
nism to exploit the vulnerabilities without detailed knowledge of the network
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topology.
Inbuilt security: Contrary to SS7 which offers no inbuilt security to the
communication between the core network nodes, Diameter provides crypto-
graphic protection in several ways [35]. It offers session-based (end-to-end)
and connection-based (hop to-hop) security through IP Security (IPsec) and
Transport Layer Security (TLS) [49]. Diameter protocols suggests using
TLS between diameter nodes. Additionally, it also supports other authen-
tication protocols, such as Password Authentication Protocol (PAP), Chal-
lenge Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP), Network Access Identi-
fier (NAI) and Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) to enhance the
security of authentication procedures.
4.2.3 Shortcomings of Diameter Security
With the strong support for AAA and other security considerations as we
discussed above, Diameter appears to provide more security to the core net-
work nodes and enhance the end-user privacy compared to SS7. Due to
this, there is the perception that “Diameter provides security by default”.
However, in reality several business and interoperability factors decides the
actual implementation and hence the level of security in LTE networks. In
addition to the generic security issues discussed in [27] (which are related to
air interface vulnerabilities), we will now discuss some of the shortcomings
which enable an attacker to impersonate network nodes.
Gap between standardization and implementation: The 3GPP
standard for Diameter base protocol [35] strongly recommends the use of
IPsec for intra-operator communication and TLS for inter-operator commu-
nication. Even though the IPsec and TLS have been standardized in Diam-
eter based communication, using them is not obligatory. Furthermore, the
nodes in a Diameter based network may have no means to verify the use of
IPsec and TLS [50] while communicating with their peers because there is no
standard procedure for it. In practice, it can be seen that many operators do
not secure their home LTE network to reduce the overhead of implementing
the non-mandatory functionality and this definitely shows their ignorance to
recognize the threats from the interconnection. It should be noted that while
we focus mostly on the attacks coming over the interconnection interface, the
same attacks can also be launched from a compromised core network node
directly. Sometime the core network nodes (that run telnet or ftp protocol)
are visible on the Internet, and the attackers may try to compromise them
to further launch their attacks.
Reachability is decided by the applications: As Diameter is an ap-
plication layer protocol, the communication messages (data packets) that a
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Diameter node sends are dependent on the application rather than on the
network configuration. An attacker can impersonate at the application layer
and penetrate deeper into the network as the application decides the reach-
ability [50]. The application driven penetration capabilities make Diameter
vulnerable to spoofing or impersonation attacks, particularly if an attacker
succeeds to intercept the interconnection traffic.
Imposed overhead due to encryption: Diameter relies on the use of
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and X.509 certificates for authentication.
The management issues with PKI, such as the key distribution, certificate
management and revocation continue to create the administration overhead
for mobile networks. Additionally, the piggybacking of acknowledgement
messages in the transport layer (via TCP or SCTP) induces more encrypted
traffic in the upper layers, which requires more bandwidth. As the inter-
connection network is a global network, the financial overhead of certificate
distribution, maintenance of certificate revocation lists, and management of
the central PKI system poses serious problems. For the same reasons, op-
erators with less capital to spend often fail to safeguard their nodes with
PKI.
Problems due to fail-over algorithms: The Diameter base protocol
[35] has provisions for various fail-over [51] and error-handling algorithms
to provide descriptive feedback in case of system or network failures. These
algorithms are initiated by the client when it has not received any answers for
a certain amount of time [52]. An attacker can impersonate a Diameter client
to flood the peers by sending bogus traffic of the fail-over algorithms. Even
though the receiving peers can recognize the traffic as bogus or faulty (if the
peer filters them), the fail-over algorithms attempt to process the traffic to
provide useful feedback, which eventually results in a denial of service (DoS)
attack. Therefore, we can argue that the Diameter protocol is vulnerable to
DoS attacks.
Support for legacy systems at the interconnection: The upgrada-
tion from 2G and 3G networks to LTE is a slow and gradual process. Due to
this, the current interconnection network contains nodes that support either
SS7 or Diameter or both, making it an inhomogeneous setup. This inhomo-
geneous setup enables an attacker to pose as a roaming partner with SS7
network and and downgrade the LTE network to use less secure legacy com-
munication messages. For interoperability with other operators, the network
edge nodes often support translation between Diameter and SS7 protocols,
which is done using Interworking Functions (IWF) [53] [54]. Additionally, the
IWF provides an easy means of porting the SS7-based attacks to Diameter-
based LTE networks. The attacks exploiting lack of security measures in the
interconnection due to interoperability can be found in detail in [36].
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4.2.4 Diameter S6a Interface
The S6a interface lies between the HSS and the MME. This is one of the most
important interfaces because the signaling messages related to authentication
and authorization are communicated over the S6a interface. This interface
is used for subscriber authentication, subscription updates, location updates
from MME etc. Unlike some local interfaces such as Sh, the S6a interface
cannot be disabled. It must always be open to roaming partners and hubs.
The following are the Diameter messages that are sent on the S6a interface:
1. Authentication-Information-Request/Answer(AIR/AIA) — MME fetches
authentication data from HSS to authenticate the subscriber.
2. Update-Location-Request/Answer (ULR/ULA) — MME stores its own
identity at HSS and fetches subscription data from HSS.
3. Notification-Request/Answer (NOR/NOA) — MME stores PDN ad-
dress and other attachment information at HSS.
4. Purge Request/Answer (PUR/PUA) — MME informs the HSS that
UE has been inactive for a long period and, thus, MME has deleted from
its end the subscription data received in the most recent ULR/ULA.
5. Insert-Subscriber-Data-Request/Answer (IDR/IDA) — Invoked by HSS
when the subscriber is attached and there is an update in the subscriber
profile at the HSS end so that the changes are reflected in subscriber
profile at the MME.
6. Delete-Subscriber-Data-Request/Answer (DSR/DSA) — Invoked by
HSS when the subscriber is attached and some data is deleted in the
subscriber profile at the HSS end so that the changes are reflected in
the subscriber profile at the MME.
7. Cancel-Location-Request/Answer (CLR/CLA) — Invoked by HSS to
detach the subscriber.
8. Reset-Request/Answer (RSR/RSA) — Invoked by HSS to inform the
MME about HSS failure or planned HSS outage. The MME should
subsequently sync the data and send fresh location/PDN information
to the HSS.
Chapter 5
Attacks on Roaming Interconnec-
tion
This chapter discusses the vulnerabilities in the global interconnection net-
work and the attacks on the interconnection network. Some SS7 attacks from
the literature are briefly discussed in the initial section. Inspired by them,
in the later sections we then propose seven potential attacks that target
Diameter signaling on the interconnection.
5.1 Interconnection Vulnerabilities
The roaming interconnection is often considered one of the weak points in a
telecommunication network, as the access is opened to many other telecom
operators and ISPs. There are multiple ways in which an attacker can gain
easy access to the roaming interconnection network. Some of the potential
methods are mentioned below
• The GSM IR.21 database is a confidential database with all information
related to International Roaming between various telecom providers. It
contains the hostnames and IP addresses of various core network ele-
ments such as the HSS, MME and the DEA. The database is accessible
only to the members of the GSM association but many operators made
them available on the Internet. For e.g. Claro Americas, which serves
clients in most South American countries, has their IR.21 database in-
formation accessible on the Internet along with sensitive information
such as login credentials [55]. Even Vivo telecom, the largest telecom-
munications company in Brazil has the IR.21 database accessible on the
Internet [56]. The incident has been reported to both Claro Americas
and Vivo telecom.
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• The roaming interconnection is global and spreads across countries and
regions where exploiting subscriber data is legal or privacy regulation
is not strictly enforced.
• Most operators lease out infrastructure and SS7 access to third parties
and various service providers. In fact, the European Union requires
operators to provide such access in order to encourage competition in
the mobile services market. The legal framework and the monitoring
of the actual behavior of the third party varies widely.
• Governments may mandate access or even take control of a network
operator in order to have unrestricted entry to the network.
• Misconfigured network nodes that are visible over the Internet (e.g. through
www.shodan.io), could be compromised and act as an entry point for
hackers.
• Insider attacks such as social engineering and bribing.
5.2 Important Identifiers
International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is a globally unique iden-
tifier for a cellular subscriber and are stored in the HSS. The IMSI can be
upto 15 digits long. It contains a 3-digit Mobile Country Code (MCC), a
2-digit Mobile Network Code (MNC) and upto 10 digits Mobile Station Iden-
tification Number (MSIN). The MCC and MNC together uniquely identify
the country and home operator of the subscriber. The MSIN is used within
the scope of the home operator [57]. To protect subscriber privacy, frequent
use of the IMSI is reduced by temporary identifiers called Temporary Mobile
Subscriber Identity (TMSI). TMSIs are locally significant to the network to
which a subscriber is connected and therefore stored only in the VLR.
Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory Number (MSISDN)
is the phone number (i.e. the number normally dialed to make a voice call)
assigned to a cellular subscriber. It contains a 3-digit Country Code (CC), 2-
3 digits National Destination Code (NDC) and a 10 digit Subscriber Number
(SN). When a subscriber is roaming in a different network, the Mobile Station
Roaming Number (MSRN) is used instead of MSISDN. The MSRN has the
same format as that of MSISDN but all the codes refer to the visited network
instead of the home network.
Global Title (GT) is an address used in the SCCP protocol for routing
signaling messages in telecommunications networks. GT is unique and serves
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as an alias for a destination address. It is usually translated into a network
address or a signaling point code within the SS7 network [41].
5.3 SS7 Attacks with Interconnection Access
As discussed before SS7 does not have inbuilt security. There are no mech-
anisms to ensure source node authentication and cryptographic protection
for communications. The only security mechanisms currently available are
related to traffic analysis, such as monitoring and screening traffic to iden-
tify unusual activity [39]. Over the last decade many vulnerabilities have
been discovered and exploited in the SS7 MAP protocol, resulting in vari-
ous attacks. These attacks include denial of service against subscribers and
network, privacy leaks, network exposure, eavesdropping, SMS interception,
fraud and credential threat [58]. In the following sections we discuss two SS7
attacks from [42] that are relevant to this thesis. Both the attacks result in
stealing of the IMSI and tracking the location of a subscriber.
5.3.1 Location Tracking with Call Setup Messages
The MS location is saved in the HLR as part of mobility management. When-
ever a MS moves into a new MSC area the location has to be updated at the
HLR. The location information is used to route the calls and short messages
to the intended MS. The general message flow when a subscriber makes a
call to another subscriber is as follows:
1. The caller’s GMSC sends the MAP Send Routing Information (MAP
SRI) message to the receiver’s HLR.
2. To get the location of the receiver’s MS, the HLR sends the MAP
Provide Roaming Number (MAP PRN) message to the VLR.
3. The VLR responds with the MAP PRN ack message, which contains
the MSRN, IMSI and the GT of the MSC serving the receiver’s MS.
4. The receiver’s HLR sends the MAP SRI Ack message containing the
MSRN, IMSI and MSC GT to the caller’s GMSC.
5. The caller’s GMSC has all the necessary information to establish a call.
Attack An attacker with SS7 access can impersonate a GMSC and track
the location of the subscriber using call setup messages. The attacker sends
a MAP SRI message to the HLR. As SS7 lacks source node authentication,
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Figure 5.1: Location Tracking with SRI
the HLR is tricked into thinking that a call is being established and responds
with MAP SRI Ack as described above. A successful attack [59] would re-
veal the IMSI and MSC GT to the attacker, which can be used to identify
the subscriber’s geo-location approximately. Figure 5.1 shows the attack
sequence.
5.3.2 Location Tracking with SMS Protocol Messages
Short Message Service (SMS) is a text messaging service that allows mobile
phone devices to exchange messages up to 140 bytes. End to end SMS
delivery comprises of two parts. First, the Mobile Originating (MO) part
where the Short Message (SM) is submitted by the sender to the SMSC.
Second, the Mobile Terminating (MT) part where the SMSC delivers the
SM to the recipient. The basic message flow is as follows:
1. MO part
• The SM along with the SMSC address (usually stored in the SIM)
are transmitted to the sender’s serving MSC.
• Sender’s MSC sends the MO ForwardSM message to the received
SMSC address.
• The SMSC acknowledges the MSC with the MO ForwardSM Ack
message after a successful delivery of the SM.
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2. MT part
• The sender’s SMSC requires the IMSI, and the GT of the serving
MSC to deliver the SM to the recipient’s MS.
• The sender’s SMSC sends the MAP Send Routing Info For SM
(MAP SRISM) message to the recipient’s HLR.
• The recipient’s HLR responds with the MAP SRISM Ack message
containing the IMSI and the MSC GT.
• The sender’s SMSC routes the SM to the recipient’s MSC for
further delivery
Figure 5.2: Location Tracking with SRISM
Attack An attacker with SS7 access can impersonate a SMSC and track
location of the subscriber using the MT-SMS protocol messages. The at-
tacker sends a MAP SRISM message to the HLR. As SS7 lacks source node
authentication, the HLR is tricked into thinking that a SM is being sent and
responds with MAP SRISM Ack as described above. A successful attack
would reveal the IMSI and MSC GT to the attacker, which can be used to
identify the subscriber’s geo-location approximately. Figure 5.2 shows the
attack sequence.
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5.4 Diameter Attacks in LTE
As part of the thesis we analysed the Diameter signaling on the LTE inter-
connection and identified seven potential attacks. Due to time constraints
we could implement only three of them in a test LTE network and the imple-
mentation of the rest is part of our future research. All the attacks are done
in two phases. The first phase is the information collection phase, which
collects information needed to perform the attack in the second phase. The
following sections discuss the practical assumptions and the two phases.
5.4.1 Practical Considerations
If an attacker can gain access to the interconnection network, then he can
start sending messages worldwide to operators that are connected either di-
rectly or through roaming hubs.
In the standard TS 33.201[46] the 3GPP has specified IPsec based secu-
rity mechanisms for Diameter. Even TLS can be used but the industry is
converging towards IPsec [60]. A key issue with the Diameter base protocol
specifications is that IPsec and TLS are recommended but not mandatory on
many interfaces [35]. Also, there are no procedures for the higher protocol
layers to verify whether IPsec or TLS has been implemented by a Diameter
node [50]. Exchanging public-key certificates between large telecom networks
with thousands of nodes of different operators is quite a challenge and a costly
process. Moreover, even if the certificates could be verified, the roaming in-
terconnection like the Internet is already so vast and open that it is not
possible to keep all malicious entities out of it. Therefore, the proposed at-
tacks work under the following assumptions, which correspond to the reality
in many deployed networks [36]:
1. IPsec is not used.
2. No layer matching is done i.e. no comparison and checking of sender
address and return address between different protocol layers.
3. No holistic checks are made by the receiving node e.g. checking if the
user is really in the given location.
If roaming hubs are utilized, then the tracking of the real sender be-
comes even greater challenge. Due to the hop-by-hop routing and use of the
hop indicator of Diameter messages, the answers to the requests are routed
to the original requester even if the data fields on the request contain the
wrong identity. This makes it possible to spoof the requester identity and
nevertheless receive answers to requests.
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5.5 Diameter Attacks: Phase 1
In this phase, the attacker knows the phone number (MSISDN) of the mobile
subscriber and tries to learn the IMSI and HSS address. The HSS address
can be obtained by brute forcing on the IP address range of the operator.
Since some operator’s IR.21 database is available on the Internet the HSS
details can be extracted from it. On the other hand, IMSI is not exactly a
well-kept secret: it is printed so some SIM and UICC cards, and can also be
accessed from the mobile device’s user interface. More information on IMSI
and MSISDN can be found in Section 5.2. There are other ways to learn
an IMSI without having physical access to the phone. Some approaches are
described below.
5.5.1 IMSI Catchers
IMSI catchers impersonate a network operator’s base station and attract
nearby mobile devices to register to it. For an LTE network, IMSI catchers
basically work by jamming the LTE radio signal and downgrading a mobile
device to use the less secure GSM and thereby circumvent the mutual au-
thentication procedure in LTE. IMSI catchers can be distinguished into two
main operating modes [61] discussed below.
Identification Mode When a mobile device gets connected to the fake
base station, the IMSI is retrieved by the IMSI catcher and the connection
is sent back to the original network by denying its original Location Update
Request with a Location Update Reject message.
Camping Mode When a mobile device is in the cell of the fake base
station, the IMSI catcher collects data and then forwards the traffic to the
genuine network. To avoid such passive snooping attacks A5/3 and A5/4
ciphers are introduced into 2G networks to replace the broken A5/1 and
A5/2 ciphers. IMSI catchers can still operate in this mode by downgrading
the network to GSM and its less secure ciphers.
5.5.2 Fake WLAN Access Points in 3G-WLAN Inter-
working
Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) is a complementary technology to
the 3GPP system. The term 3G-WLAN interworking refers to extending the
3GPP services and functionality to the WLAN access environment [62]. The
3G-WLAN interworking is built on a key technology called Extensible Au-
thentication Protocol (EAP) [63] which is an authentication framework that
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supports multiple authentication methods called EAP methods. Extensible
Authentication Protocol for SIM (EAP-SIM) [64] is an EAP method that
allows using the SIM and GSM authentication vectors and cryptographic
functions within the EAP framework. Extensible Authentication Protocol
Method for Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA) [65] is an EAP
method that allows the USIM and UMTS authentication vectors and crypto-
graphic functions within the EAP framework [30]. A WLAN UE should sup-
port either of these EAP methods to access the 3GPP services. The overview
of the EAP based authentication in 3G-WLAN interworking is shown in Fig-
ure 5.3. After successful WLAN registration, the UE’s identity is requested
by the AAA server. The UE responds with the IMSI in the EAP-Response
message. The detailed information of the messages can be found in 3GPP
TS 33.234 [66].
Figure 5.3: 3G-WLAN Interworking Using EAP-SIM/EAP-AKA
Attack An attacker can setup a fake WLAN access point and can trick
(for e.g. by jamming other signals) the UE to register itself. After registration
the attacker can send an EAP-Request/Identity message to the UE and the
UE responds with the IMSI in EAP-Response/Identity message. Thereby an
attacker can steal the IMSI.
5.5.3 Diameter Send Routing Info for SM Procedure
The Send-Routing-Info-for-SM-Request (SRR) on the S6c [67] interface is
sent by the SMSC to the HSS in order to retrieve the routing information
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needed for routing a short message to the serving MME of the recipient. It
is the equivalent of MAP SRISM in the LTE network and Diameter. The
working and functionality is the same as described in Section 5.3.2. Figure 5.4
illustrates the workflow of the SMS MT part in LTE.
Figure 5.4: SMS MT Part Workflow
Figure 5.5: Obtaining IMSI with SRR
Attack An attacker with an interconnection access can misuse the above
protocol to identify the IMSI and identity of the subscriber’s serving MME.
The SRR request must contain a mandatory SC-Address AVP whose value
is the SMSC address in the E.164 format [68]. The request must also contain
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the MSISDN AVP to identify the subscriber. After a successful attack, the
attacker will receive a SRA message with the Serving-Node AVP which in
turn contains the Diameter identity and the Diameter realm of the MME and
SGSN (if present). If the home network uses SMS home routing (Section 7.2)
then the MT-SMS Correlation ID is sent in the SRA instead of IMSI. If a
SMS home router is deployed, then the SRR message can also be used to
explicitly request the IMSI of a subscriber. To do this, the SRR message
should contain the SM-Delivery Not Intended AVP with the value only IMSI
along with the SC-Address and MSISDN AVPs. This indicates that the
IMSI is requested and delivery of a short message is not intended. The
attack sequence is shown in Figure 5.5.
5.6 Diameter Attacks: Phase 2
In the first phase of the attacks, the identity of the serving MME and IMSI
are discovered, as described above. In the second phase, the attacker imper-
sonates a HSS towards the MME or as MME towards the HSS, according
to the 3GPP TS 29.272 [69] and performs the attack over the S6a interface.
The attacks are described in the following sections.
5.6.1 DoS Attack with CLR
The Cancel-Location-Request (CLR) message is sent by the HSS to the MME.
This message informs the MME about an initial attach procedure, or about
an ongoing change in the serving MME, or about subscription withdrawal of
a subscriber.
Bit Name Description
0 S6a/S6d Indicator When set, indicates that the CLR message
is sent on the S6a interface; when cleared,
indicates the S6d interface
1 Reattach-Required When set, indicates that the MME should
request the UE to initiate an immediate re-
attach procedure
Table 5.1: Bitmask description of CLR-Flags AVP [69]
The CLR message must contain two mandatory AVPs. First, the User-
Name AVP whose value is the IMSI of the subscriber. Second, the Cancellation-
Type AVP which is an enumeration. When it is set to the enum value Sub-
scription Withdrawal (2), the MME deletes the subscription data and de-
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Figure 5.6: HSS Initiated Detach Procedure
Figure 5.7: UE Attach Procedure
CHAPTER 5. ATTACKS ON ROAMING INTERCONNECTION 42
taches the UE. An overview of the HSS initiated detach procedure is shown
in Figure 5.6 and the detailed procedure can be found in 3GPP TS 23.272 [70].
Furthermore, the HSS can also specify additional actions, such as requesting
the UE to re-attach to the network immediately after the detach. This is
achieved through the CLR-Flags AVP whose value is a bitmask. The bits
relevant to the attack are described in Table 5.1, and the detailed description
of all the bits can be found in Section 7.3.152 of [69]. An overview of the UE
attach procedure can be seen in Figure 5.7, and the detailed procedure can
be found in 3GPP TS 24.301 [71].
Figure 5.8: DoS with CLR
Attack An attacker with interconnection access can impersonate the HSS
of the subscriber’s home network and send a CLR to the serving MME to
cause a DoS attack against the subscriber. Figure 5.8 shows the attack se-
quence. The CLR should contain the AVPs described above and is expressed
as XML in Snippet 5.1. A serving MME receiving this CLR message will
detach the subscriber from the network, thereby resulting in a denial of ser-
vice. Furthermore, a DoS attack is possible on both the serving MME and
the actual HSS of the home network. If the Reattach-Required bit is set
in the CLR-Flags AVP, the UE initiates the attach procedure. The attach
procedure involves a lot of signaling messages and performing this attack
continuously can create signaling storms in the core network. In this way,
the MME and the HSS can be overloaded with signaling messages which
could ultimately lead to performance degradation or even their failure. This
attack might also cause a battery drain in the UE. The attack is implemented
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in a test network and the results are presented in Section 6.2.1.
<command name="Cancel-Location-Request" code="317">
<avp name="User-Name" value="XXXXXXXXXXX4001" />
<avp name="Cancellation-Type" value="2" />
<avp name="CLR-Flags" value="3"/>
</command>
Snippet 5.1: CLR Message for DoS Attack
5.6.2 DoS Attack with ULR
The Update-Location-Request (ULR) message is sent by the MME to the
HSS. This message informs the HSS about the identity of the MME currently
serving the subscriber, and optionally provides other subscriber data such as
the Radio Access Terminal (RAT) information.
Bit Name Description
1 S6a/S6d Indicator When set, indicates that the ULR message
is sent on the S6a interface; when cleared,
indicates the S6d interface
5 Initial-Attach-
Indicator
When set, indicates that the HSS should
send a CLR with Cancellation-Type of
MME Update Procedure to the serving MME
(if any registered for the IMSI in context)
Table 5.2: Bitmask description of ULR-Flags AVP [69]
The ULR must contain the following mandatory AVPs. First, the User-
Name AVP whose value is the IMSI of the subscriber. Second, Visited-
PLMNId whose value is the concatenation of the Mobile Country Code
(MCC) and the Mobile Network Code (MNC). Third, the RAT-Type whose
value is the RAT information the UE is using. Fourth, the ULR-Flags AVP
whose value is a bitmask. The bits relevant to the attack are described in
Table 5.2, and the detailed description of all the bits can be found in Section
7.3.7 of [69]. When the HSS receives an ULR, it replaces the stored MME
identity with the value received in the ULR’s Origin-Host AVP.
Attack An attacker with interconnection access can impersonate a MME
of a roaming partner and send an ULR to the HSS of the subscriber’s home
network, to cause a DoS attack against the subscriber. Figure 5.9 shows the
attack sequence. The ULR should contain the AVPs described above and is
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Figure 5.9: DoS Attack with ULR
expressed as XML in Snippet 5.2. A HSS receiving this ULR message will
send a CLR to the subscriber’s serving MME, and therefore the subscriber
gets detached from the network, resulting in a denial of service. The MCC
and MNC codes are available on many websites, such as mcc-mnc.com, mc-
clist.com etc., and so the Visited-PLMNId can be easily obtained to carry
out the attack. The attack is implemented in a test network and the results
are presented in Section 6.2.2.
<command name="Update-Location-Request" code="316">
<avp name="User-Name" value="XXXXXXXXXXX4001" />
<avp name="Visited-PLMNId" value="XXXX3"/>
<avp name="RAT-Type" value="1004"/>
<avp name="ULR-Flags" value="34"/>
</command>
Snippet 5.2: ULR Message for DoS Attack
5.6.3 DoS and Fraud Attacks with IDR
The Insert-Subscriber-Data-Request (IDR) message is sent by the HSS to
the MME. This message is invoked due to administrative changes, such as
adding or updating the subscription information at the MME, requesting
certain subscriber data from the MME, and applying or removing Operator
Determined Barring (ODB) [72] for a subscriber. ODB allows the home
network operator to regulate access to the services availed by a subscriber.
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Bit Description
0 All Packet Oriented Services Barred
1 Roamer Access HPLMN-AP Barred
2 Roamer Access to VPLMN-AP Barred
3 Barring of all outgoing calls
4 Barring of all outgoing international calls
5 Barring of all outgoing international calls except those directed to
the home PLMN country
6 Barring of all outgoing inter-zonal calls
7 Barring of all outgoing inter-zonal calls except those directed to the
home PLMN country
8 Barring of all outgoing international calls except those directed to
the home PLMN country and Barring of all outgoing inter-zonal
calls
Table 5.3: Bitmask description of Operator-Determined-Barring AVP [69]
The IDR must contain two mandatory AVPs. First, the User-Name AVP
whose value is the IMSI of the subscriber. Second, the Subscription-Data
AVP which contains the part of the subscription profile that either is to be
added or updated in the subscription profile stored in the MME. To apply
or remove ODB the Subscription-Data AVP can contain two child AVPs.
First, the Subscriber-Status AVP, an enumeration that specifies if a ser-
vice is granted or barred. It informs the MME that certain services are
barred for the subscriber when set to the enum value 1. Second, the Op-
erator Determined Barring, is a bitmask that indicates the barred services.
The meaning of the bits is defined in Table 5.3 and the detailed description
can be found in Section 7.3.30 of [69]. ODB can be removed by setting the
Subscriber-Status AVP to the value 0.
Attack An attacker with interconnection access can impersonate the HSS
of the subscriber’s home network and send an IDR to the subscriber’s serv-
ing MME in order to bar the services of a subscriber. The message should
contain the above described AVPs and is expressed as XML in Snippet 5.3.
A MME receiving this IDR message will bar the services of a subscriber,
thereby resulting in a denial of service attack. The attacker can also misuse
the IDR message to unbar the barred services of a subscriber and thereby
resulting in a fraud attack. This impacts the revenue flow of the operator
rather than the data flow and does not break any underlying technology. The
attack sequence is shown in Figure 5.10. The attack is implemented in a test
network and the results are presented in Section 6.2.2.
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Figure 5.10: DoS Attack with IDR
<command name="Insert-Subscriber-Data-Request" code="319">
<avp name="User-Name" value="XXXXXXXXXXX4001" />
<avp name="Subscription-Data">
<avp name="Subscriber-Status" value="1" />
<avp name="Operator-Determined-Barring" value="511" />
</avp>
</command>
Snippet 5.3: IDR Message for DoS Attack
5.6.4 Location Tracking with IDR
The HSS can send the IDR message to a MME to request the location in-
formation of a subscriber. Along with the User-Name and Subscriber-Data
AVPs, the IDR must also contain a IDR-Flags AVP, whose value is a bit-
mask. The bits relevant to the attacks are described in Table 5.4, and the
detailed description of all the bits can be found in Section 7.3.103 of [69].
A MME receiving the IDR-Flags with the EPS Location Information Re-
quest bit set, responds with the EPS-Location-Information AVP. This AVP in
turn contains three more AVPs: Cell-Global-Identity, Location-Area-Identity,
Service-Area-Identity. If the Current Location Request bit is set along with
EPS Location Information bit and the UE is in idle mode, then the MME
will page the UE to return the most up-to-date location of the subscriber.
Attack An attacker with interconnection access can impersonate the HSS
of the subscriber’s home network and send an IDR to the subscriber’s serv-
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Bit Name Description
0 UE Reachability
Request
When set, informs the MME that the HSS
is awaiting a notification of UE reachability.
(This bit is used in the attack described in
Section 5.6.6)
3 EPS Location In-
formation Request
When set, informs the MME that the HSS is
requesting the subscriber’s location informa-
tion.
4 Current Location
Request
When set, informs the MME to provide the
most current location information by paging
the UE (if in idle mode). This bit can be
used only in conjunction with bit 3.
5 Local Time Zone
Request
When set, informs the MME that the HSS
is requesting the time zone of the location in
the visited network where the UE is attached.
Table 5.4: Bitmask description of IDR-Flags AVP [69]
ing MME to track the location of the subscriber. The IDR must contain the
above described AVPs and is expressed as XML in Snippet 5.4. Figure 5.11
shows the attack sequence. The MME receiving this message responds with
the location information and the time zone which can be used to identify the
approximate location of the subscriber. The implementation of this attack
is part of our future research.
<command name="Insert-Subscriber-Data-Request" code="319">
<avp name="User-Name" value="XXXXXXXXXXX4001" />
<avp name="Subscription-Data"> </avp>
<avp name="IDR-Flags" value="56" />
</command>
Snippet 5.4: IDR Message for Location Tracking Attack
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Figure 5.11: Location Tracking Attack with IDR
5.6.5 DoS Attack with NOR
The Notify Request (NOR) is sent by the MME to the HSS. It is used to notify
the HSS about various events, such as an update of UE terminal information,
UE reachability, and removal of MME registration for SMS. For the removal
of MME registration for SMS, the NOR message must contain two AVPs.
First, the User-Name AVP whose value is the IMSI of the subscriber. Second,
the NOR-Flags AVP whose value is a bitmask. The bits relevant to the attack
are described in Table 5.5, and the detailed description of all the bits can
be found in Section 7.3.49 of [69]. Bit 9 is Removal of MME Registration
for SMS which, when set, indicates that the MME requests to remove its
registration for SMS. The detailed procedure for removal of SMS registration
can be found in 3GPP TS 23.272 [70].
Bit Name Description
8 S6a/S6d Indicator When set, indicates that the NOR message
is sent on the S6a interface; when cleared,
indicates the S6d interface
9 Removal of MME
Registration for
SMS
When set, indicates that the MME requests
to remove its registration for SMS from the
HSS
Table 5.5: Bitmask description of NOR-Flags AVP [69]
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Figure 5.12: SMS DoS Attack with NOR
Attack An attacker with interconnection access can impersonate a MME
of a roaming partner and send a NOR to the HSS of the subscriber’s home
network, to cause a SMS DoS attack. The message should contain the above
described AVPs and is expressed as XML in Snippet 5.5. The HSS receiving
this NOR message will remove SMS registration for the MME, and thereby
resulting in SMS denial of service for some subscribers (associated with the
HSS) attached to the MME. Figure 5.12 shows the attack sequence. The
implementation of this attack is part of our future research.
<command name="Notify-Request" code="323">
<avp name="User-Name" value="XXXXXXXXXXX4001" />
<avp name="NOR-Flags" value="768"/>
</command>
Snippet 5.5: NOR Message for SMS DoS Attack
5.6.6 DoS Attack with IDR and NOR Combined
The IDR can be used to inform the MME that the HSS is awaiting a no-
tification of UE reachability. This is done by setting bit 0 in the IDR-
Flags AVP. The bit description can be seen in Table 5.4. When there is
an authenticated radio contact from the UE, the MME sends a NOR to the
HSS to inform about the UE reachability. If the MME receives a Notifi-
cation Answer (NOA) message from the HSS with the result code DIAME-
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TER ERROR USER UNKNOWN, the MME will detach the UE and remove
the subscriber from its database.
Figure 5.13: DoS Attack with IDR and NOR Combined
Attack An attacker with interconnection access can impersonate the HSS
of the subscriber’s home network and send an IDR to the subscriber’s serving
MME with bit 0 set in the IDR-Flags AVP. The MME responds with a NOR
when there is a radio contact from the UE. The attacker receiving the NOR,
sends a NOA with the result code DIAMETER ERROR USER UNKNOWN.
The MME receiving this NOA will detach the subscriber from the network,
and thereby resulting in a denial of service. Figure 5.12 shows the attack
sequence. The message format is the same as described in the previous sec-
tions. The implementation of this attack is part of our future research.
5.6.7 DoS Attack with RSR
The Reset-Request is sent by the HSS to the MME to inform about a previous
HSS failure or about maintenance operations for e.g. to allow planned HSS
outage without service interruption. The RSR message contains a User-Id
CHAPTER 5. ATTACKS ON ROAMING INTERCONNECTION 51
AVP whose value is a list of User-Ids. A User-Id contains the leading digits
of an IMSI (i.e. MCC, MNC, leading digits of MSIN) which identifies the
set of subscribers whose IMSIs start with the User-Id. The MME receiving
a RSR triggers restoration procedures [73] for all the subscribers associated
with the received User-Ids. The MME sends an ULR to the HSS as part of
the restoration procedure.
Figure 5.14: DoS Attack with RSR
Attack An attacker with interconnection access can impersonate the HSS
of the subscriber’s home network and send a RSR to the subscriber’s serving
MME to cause a DoS attack against the actual HSS. The message should
contain User-Id AVP with the value MCC+MNC and is expressed as XML
in Snippet 5.6. The MME will start restoration procedures for all the sub-
scribers whose IMSI match with the User-Id. An ULR is sent to the HSS for
each matching subscriber. Performing this attack continuously can create sig-
naling storms in the core network. The MME and the HSS can be overloaded
with signaling messages and might ultimately lead to performance degrada-
tion or even their failure. The attack sequence is shown in Figure 5.14. The
implementation of this attack is part of our future research.
<command name="Reset-Request" code="322">
<avp name="User-ID" value="XXXX3" />
</command>
Snippet 5.6: RSR Message for DoS Attack
Chapter 6
Experiments
Experiments were conducted to verify the attacks in a test network of a
global operator which corresponds to an actual deployed network. Due to
the privacy and security legislation in the country of residence of the author,
the attacks could not be performed in practice against real subscribers in
deployed networks.
6.1 Testbed Setup
The test network setup is illustrated in Figure 6.1. The UE is roaming in
the test network and has Internet access. It is connected to the network
through a HeNodeB. The DEA is the network entry and exit point for the
roaming interconnection and acts as a Diameter routing agent. The DEA
does not have any filtering mechanism. The attacker is a laptop computer
with two network interfaces which have access to the interconnection net-
work. The interface with IP xx.xx.34.14 is used impersonate the HSS of the
HPLMN. The interface with IP xx.xx.34.10 is used to impersonate the MME
of the VPLMN. The attacker laptop computer is also configured with a cus-
tom Diameter traffic generator which we developed based on the RestComm
jDiameter [74] open-source library.
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Figure 6.1: Test Network Setup
6.2 Results
The results shown in the following sections are network captures (using Wire-
shark [75] tool) on the interfaces of MME and HSS in the test network. All
the confidential information, such as IP addresses, IMSIs, host names and
realm names have been blacked out in the images.
6.2.1 DoS Attack with CLR
Figure 6.2 illustrates a successful DoS attack on the subscriber with CLR.
The attacker impersonated the HSS and sent a CLR message to the MME.
The MME detached the UE from the network and also requested the UE
to re-attach. After the detach, the UE initiated the attach procedure which
included the AIR/AIA and ULR/ULA along with other signaling messages.
The highlighted portions show the sequence of messages. Figure 6.3 shows
the contents of the CLR message sent.
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Figure 6.2: CLR DoS: Wireshark Overview
Figure 6.3: CLR DoS: CLR Message Contents
6.2.2 DoS Attack with ULR
Figure 6.4 illustrates a successful DoS attack on the subscriber with ULR
message. The attacker impersonated a partner MME and sent an ULR mes-
sage to the HSS. The HSS triggered a CLR and sent it to the serving MME
which detaches the UE from the network. The highlighted portions show the
sequence of messages. Figure 6.5 shows the contents of the ULR message.
Figure 6.6 shows the contents of the CLR message triggered due to the ULR.
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Figure 6.4: ULR DoS: Wireshark Overview
Figure 6.5: ULR DoS: ULR Message Contents
Figure 6.6: ULR DoS: CLR Message Contents
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6.2.3 DoS Attack with IDR
Figure 6.7 illustrates a successful DoS attack on the subscriber with IDR
message. The attacker impersonated the HSS and sent an IDR to the MME.
The MME barred the services for the subscriber and detached the UE from
the network. The highlighted portions show the sequence of messages. Fig-
ure 6.8 shows the contents of the IDR message. The change of subscription
data could not be captured in wireshark as it is an MME internal opera-
tion. The fraud attack sequence is the same as the DoS attack except for the
changes in IDR content.
Figure 6.7: IDR DoS: Wireshark Overview
Figure 6.8: IDR DoS: IDR Message Contents
Chapter 7
Countermeasures
In this chapter we discuss potential countermeasures and mitigation strate-
gies to counteract the attacks we identified. We also discuss the challenges
and trade-offs for these countermeasures.
7.1 Using IPsec
IPsec protection following 3GPP TS 33.210 is one of the foremost protection
measures that can be deployed. IPsec ensures that the both ends of a tunnel
know the identity of each other. But it is helpful only if the other end could
be trusted. The trust issue becomes challenging, in particular, when hop-
by-hop security is deployed, for example, in roaming hubs because each hop
would need its own IPsec tunnel. In such a hop-by-hop security approach,
the duty of checking the next leg of the communication and ensuring that the
communication is secure within the roaming hub server falls on the roaming
hub provider. In SS7, there was no need for certificate management, therefore
the roaming hub providers did not have any related costs. When it comes
to Diameter, extra costs are to be incurred by the roaming hub providers.
So changes to business practices would be needed. Another major challenge
is that, if a partner operator rents out access to less trustworthy entities, it
might potentially lead to the misuse of the trusted certificates of the partner
operator. Also governments and spy agencies can misuse the operators in
their own country, for e.g. to track the location of people.
7.2 SMS Home Routing
SMS protocol is one of the most commonly exploited protocols by the attack-
ers to sniff operator network topology and to obtain subscriber information
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such as IMSI. As per 3GPP TS 29.338 [67], for SMS routing, the SMSC of the
subscriber contacts the HSS of the home network to identify the location of
the recipient’s UE. Normally all outbound and cross-network SMS messages
pass through the sender’s home network. Since SMS was initially designed
for voice-message notification and not as a person-to-person messaging sys-
tem, the inbound messages generated on other networks can be directly sent
to the target subscribers that are under the control of the sending network.
The MT-SMS protocol is discussed in Section 5.5.3.
Figure 7.1: SMS Home Routing
The 3GPP TR 23.840 [76], defines Mobile Terminated SMS home routing
where the inbound short messages are routed through a MT service platform
(commonly called SMS router), in the recipient’s home network. Figure 7.1
illustrates the working of SMS home routing. The SMS router safeguards
the IMSI of a subscriber by using a 15 digit MT-SMS Correlation ID, which
is unique and mapped to the IMSI and MSISDN of a subscriber. In a SRA
message the Correlation-ID is sent instead of the IMSI, thereby hiding the
IMSI from the sender’s SMSC. The Correlation-ID consists of a 3-digit MCC,
a 3-digit MNC and a 9-digit Sender ID. The structure of MT-SMS Correlation
ID is shown in Figure 7.2. The MCC and MNC are the codes of receiver’s
HPLM, whereas the Sender ID is a random number unique for its lifetime.
The Sender ID maps the inbound MT Forward SM message to a previous
SRR.
SMS home routing relieves the VPLMN from requesting the IMSI and lo-
cation of the receiving UE, and thereby defends the network against privacy
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Figure 7.2: MT-SMS Correlation ID
breaches and fraud. The SMS router can also implement other protection
mechanisms, such as anti-spam and filtering to defend against spam, phishing
and malware. SMS home routing is not mandatory and the implementation
of the protection mechanisms is up to the operator. However, the possi-
ble implementation flaw with SM-Delivery Not Intended AVP discussed in
Section 5.5.3 should be take care of when implementing SMS home routing.
7.3 Enhancements in DEA/DRA
Diameter Edge Agents and Diameter Routing Agents are the entry and exit
points of any roaming interconnection. So securing the DEA/DRA can help
in preventing many attacks. Since some of the messages used for the attacks
that we described are part of regular communication, directly blocking those
messages would interrupt the cellular services. The first approach is, that the
nodes residing on the edge have proper interface separation i.e. they know if
a message is for the Sh or S6a interface. For example, only some interfaces
are open on the roaming interconnection such as S6a/S6d, S8, S9, and all
other interface connections should be rejected on the interconnection.
Efficient filtering mechanisms based on the smart combination of cross-
layer verification, IP address based blocking, origin host and realm checking,
AVP verification and advance access control methods are recommended the
LTE networks against the location privacy breach attacks. Firstly, the opera-
tors should white-list their partners based on the protocols, IP address of the
nodes, or origin host and realm and support for requested applications and
required permissions. Such white-listing is highly recommended due to the
increased risk for the support for interoperability with lower generation net-
works of partner operators. Secondly, the operators should thoroughly mon-
itor their network traffic in real time. They should include robust statistical
traffic analysis methods to detect any unusual or abnormal behavior of the
network nodes. Furthermore, the traffic from suspected nodes should be di-
rected to honey-pots for further investigation to finally block the nodes. One
of the key advantages of using strong access control policies in the nodes—
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particularly in DEA/DRA — is that, even if the attacker bypasses sender
origin filtering, the node would not respond beyond its configured functional-
ity. On the other hand, the cross-layer verification in the hop-by-hop routes
of Diameter helps to verify the origin of a message such that the operators
can automatically block the messages originated from illicit nodes. However,
telecom networks have a large number of requests every second and filtering
every message might have a significant effect on the node performance. So,
there is a security vs performance trade-off. The above mentioned filtering
mechanisms might be available in the firewalls available in the market and it
is very important to configure the firewall policies to effectively defend the
LTE network against the attacks that are discussed in this thesis.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
Diameter is gradually replacing the SS7 signaling protocol in the next gener-
ation telecommunication networks. In this thesis, we provided a comprehen-
sive review of security considerations of Diameter protocol. We discussed the
possible exploits in Diameter signaling for an LTE network, which enables
an attacker to deny services to targeted subscribers and illegitimately track
the location of the mobile users. Though the advantages of Diameter signal-
ing are many, the default security provided by Diameter is not sufficient to
make LTE an attack-resistant network. While the roaming interconnections
ensures cost-efficient way to provide cellular services on a global scale, it is
important to deploy additional measures in the interconnection network to
protect the users from privacy breaches and denial of service.
We described the various internal components of the core network, the
roaming architecture to provide an insight into the working of 4G networks.
Furthermore, we gave a detailed background on the interconnection network
and the signaling protocols used. We explained how an attacker can gain
access to the interconnection network and exploit the diameter signaling
messages. We described in detail the various attacks ranging from denial
of service to location tracking. We demonstrated the practical relevance of
these attacks by implementing some of them in a test network and discussed
their results in detail. We also articulated some potential countermeasures
and explained the security mechanisms that can be used to identify attackers
and block malicious messages at the Diameter Edge Agents (DEA) without
affecting the normal functioning of other core network nodes.
The findings in this thesis are very useful to ensure interconnection secu-
rity in the existing LTE deployments and the ones that are to be deployed.
The standardization of fifth generation mobile networks has gained a lot of
momentum recently and we argue that, without appropriate countermeasures
and mitigation techniques in place, the threats discussed in this thesis might
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be carried onto the next generation networks. With this thesis, we go one
step further in the direction towards a sound telecom security architecture.
The future work includes implementation of unverified attacks and finding
appropriate mitigation strategies.
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